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In Japan, the software patent system has been reformed and now software has become 
a patentable subject matter. In this paper, this pro-patent shift on software is surveyed 
and its impact on software innovation is analyzed. Before the 1990’s, inventions related 
to software could not be patented by themselves, but they could be applied when 
combined with hardware related inventions. Therefore, integrated electronics firms 
used to be the major software patent applicants. However, during the period from the 
late 1990’s to the early 2000’s, when software patent reforms were introduced, 
innovative activities (measuring patent applications) by independent software 
development firms began.   
We used datasets linking the IIP (Institute of Intellectual Property) patent database 
(individual patent datasets by using JPO’s publication data) and firm level data from 
the Survey on Selected Services (software part) (METI) and the Basic Survey of 
Business Activity and Structure (METI). Based on the panel datasets from 
approximately 550 firms from 2001 to 2005, we found that patent applications from 
software firms gradually increased from the 1990’s, while we were unable to find a 
direct impact of software patent system reforms. In addition, it was also found that 
patent application is positively related to a software company’s independent strategy of 
subcontracting out system headed by large system integrators.   
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1.  Introduction 
The Japanese government published the Strategic Framework for Intellectual Property 
Policy in June 2003. The purpose of this policy is to enhance Japan's industrial 
competitiveness by promoting the creation, strengthening the protection, and promoting 
the utilization of intellectual property (IP). In addition, the Basic Law on Intellectual 
Property was established in November 2003, and led to action plans to promote the 
creation, dissemination, and effective exploitation of IP to contribute to the development 
of new industries. Implementation of this action plan involves various related 
ministries, and is coordinated by the Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters, headed 
by the Prime Minister. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japan's economy has been mired in long period of 
stagnation. Stimulation of business innovation is vital to breaking out of this confining 
situation. The Strategic Framework for Intellectual Property aims to encourage 
innovation through proactive actions plans for stimulating, effective use of intellectual 
property. Key elements of the Strategic Framework include so-called pro-patent policies, 
which involve speeding up patent examination procedures, revising the tort system, and 
protecting IP in new fields such as biotechnology and information technology (IT). 
Against this background, one frequently encounters the argument that the pro-patent 
policies adopted by the U.S., which had been mired in decreasing competitiveness in the 
1980s, provided the driving force behind today's rebirth of American competitiveness. 
Representative examples of pro-patent policies advanced in the U.S. in the 1980s 
include the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) to 
specialize in appeals concerning patent infringement, and the extension of patent 3 
 
protections in the biotechnology and software fields. Such extension and strengthening 
of patent rights is argued to have stimulated business innovation, leading to the 
enhancement of US competitiveness. In addition, in the U.S., the amount of damage 
compensation in connection with patent disputes has recently soared. This increase 
may contribute to the trend towards the strengthening of patent rights as well. 
However, even in the U.S., opinions are divided as to whether pro-patent policies to 
expand and strengthen patent protections have had any visible effects on business 
innovation. A wide range of factors influence the incentives for research and 
development (R&D) investment and new product development by businesses. These 
factors include the economic condition of the businesses, as well as expanding 
technological opportunities, and policy factors not related to the IP system (i.e. 
pharmaceutical safety regulations). Results of most analyses, primarily of U.S. cases, 
indicate that pro-patent policies have only marginal effects on business innovation 
(Kortum and Lerner (1999), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), and Lerner (2002)). In addition, 
one criticism of pro-patent policies lies in the "anti-commons" problem. Taking the 
pharmaceuticals field as an example, the anti-commons argument states that 
successive applications of patent protections to genetic innovations results in decreased 
R&D efficiency, by increasing the number of patent licenses required in order to conduct 
such R&D (Eisenberg and Heller (1998). Another vital issue concerns the goal of IP 
rights policies to promote the circulation of technology by providing incentives for 
business innovation and clarifying rights to established technologies. Granting 
excessive exclusive rights to specific technologies may impede the circulation of such 
technology. 
This paper empirically investigates the role of software patents in innovations by 4 
 
software companies. Originally, software related invention could be protected by 
copyright. However, since copyright law ultimately protects expression, not ideas, 
protection of software under patent law also came under consideration. In the 
consideration of patent protection for software, issues arose concerning whether 
software qualifies under the patent law requirement that an invention include 
technological ideas along the line of natural science theory. Through the early 1990s, 
software itself, which consisted simply of calculation methods, was not considered to be 
subject to patent protection. However, software enabling the functioning of hardware, 
such as the Japanese language input system used in word processors, was allowed 
patent protection together with such hardware. In line with the increase in packaged 
software not embedded in hardware, in 1997 patent protection was allowed for software 
recorded on media such as floppy disks. In 2000, software was made eligible for patent 
protection as software itself, and in 2002 this protection was extended to software that 
circulates on computer networks. 
In order to investigate the impact of software patent reforms, we have constructed the 
database of Japanese software firms by linking the IIP patent database and firm level 
data from the Survey on Selected Services (software part) (METI) and Basic Survey of 
Business Activity and Structure (METI). These datasets have been used for empirical 
analysis of innovation activities of software firms since the middle 1990’s. The next 
section of this paper surveys a discussion on software patents as well as existing studies 
in this topic. Section 3 describes the dataset and the trend of patenting activities by 
software companies. Then, a section for econometrics analysis on software patent and 
innovation follows. Finally this paper concludes with a summary of findings and policy 
implications.  5 
 
2.  Survey of software the patent system and its economic impact       
Granting patent rights for software began in the United States. In 1981, the Supreme 
Court stated that a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer" and 
a claim is patentable if it is embedded with equipment (Diamond v. Diehr). In 1994, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) ruled in the In Re Alappat case that 
computer software is patentable per se by using the same non-obviousness and 
inventive step requirement. As a consequence of this court decision, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a comprehensive revision to examine 
guidelines for computer related inventions, explicitly indicating software as a 
patentable subject matter. In addition, the CAFC supported the patentability of 
business method (re State Street Bank) in 1998, which was followed by an explosion of 
business method patent applications. 
In Japan, software became patentable in a similar way. First, the Japan Patent Office 
(JPO) issued examination guidelines in 1993, stating only computer software coupled 
with hardware inventions could be patented. In 1997, the JPO decided that storage 
media containing software could also be regarded as a patentable subject matter. This 
guideline was amended again in 2000 and software itself (including software provided 
online (without storage media)) has been patentable since then. Furthermore, in 2002, 
patent law was finally amended to designate explicitly “software” as a patentable 
subject. In terms of business method patents, such patent applications increased 
sharply in Japan as well after the State Street Bank case, but it was a temporary 
explosion since the agreement of examination guidelines by the European Patent Office 
(EPO), JPO and USPTO was only achieved in 2000.   6 
 
In contrast to such movements, there are some arguments against software patents. It 
may be difficult to evaluate novelty and inventive steps in software invention. As a 
result, increasing low quality patents lead to higher probability in patent infringement. 
There is also a view that increasing the number of software related patents creates a 
dense patent thicket and does harm to innovation in the IT industry. It was found that a 
substantial share of patent applications is not for protecting the patent’s invention, but 
for ensuring the flexibility of R&D in some technology fields (Graham and Mowery, 
2003). This kind of motivation for patenting further pushes up the number of patent 
applications and blurs the boundaries between patent claims (as a result of the 
intangible nature of software), which may lead to increases in potential patent 
infringement cases and transaction costs in the technology market.   
On the other hand, there are also views in favor of software patents. There some studies 
indicating that software patents are relatively higher in their economic value. Hall and 
McGarbie (2006) showed that marginal contribution to the Tobin’s Q of a firm is higher 
for software patents than for other types. In addition, it was found that there is a 
positive relationship between the survival rate of internet startup companies since the 
IT bubble burst and the number of software patents (Cockburn and Wagner, 2007).   
Software related inventions could be patented with hardware, even before system 
reforms were introduced. Therefore, recent reforms may not have a substantial impact 
on large electronics firms, who invent software as well as hardware. On the other hand, 
an impact can be found in purely software companies. Therefore, we focus on innovation 
activities in software companies since the middle 1990’s in this study.   
 7 
 
3.  Data description and patenting activities of software companies 
In this paper, we have constructed the datasets by linking the following three types of 
databases. 
x  IIP Patent Database: Individual patent database constructed from the JPO’s patent 
publication information (Goto and Motohashi, 2007).   
x  Basic Survey on Business Structure and Activity (BSBSA): METI’s survey data at 
firm level, annually conducted for all manufacturing, retail, wholesale and some 
service (including software) firms with 50 or more employees and capital of 30 
million yen or more.   
x  Survey of Selected Service Industry: METI’s survey data at establishment level, 
annually conducted for all establishments in some service area (including 
software). 
Individual patent data by the IIP patent database is aggregated at the firm level by 
using applicant name and establishment level data from the Survey of Selected Service 
Industry, which is also aggregated at the firm level by using firm identifier information 
from each establishment. These two datasets are linked with firm level data by the 
BSBSA. We have selected software firms by picking up the firms with an 80% or more 
software output share by using line of business output information from the BSBSA. 
Finally, we have got about 550 samples for every year between 2001 and 2005, as well 
as only patent application information before 2001.   
In this section, a trend of patent application of these software companies is surveyed. 
First, we have analyzed technology classifications of patents applied by software 
companies. A patent count by International Patent Classification (IPC) sub group is 8 
 
shown in Table 1.   
(Table 1) 
  The following technology groups can be found frequently. 
x  Data processing system for the purpose of management, commerce and financial 
transactions (including e-commerce and business method): G06F17/60, 
G06F15/20,21 (version 4) 
x  Information systems and control inside computer: G06F12/, G06F13/ 
x  Information retrieval and database structure: G06F17/30, G06F15/40 (version 4) 
x  Program control: G06F9/ 
x  Digital computer in general: G06F15/ 
x  Error detection: G06F11/ 
In Figure 4, a time trend of these patent applications is displayed. The patent count 
peaked in 1991 and decreased thereafter, but increased again in 2006. However, it 
should be noted that the multiple claim system was introduced in 1989 in Japan, and 
the number of claims per patent is still increasing. In this sense, it may be appropriate 
to look at the trend by the total number of claims. In term of this figure, a steady 
increase can be found until 2001, but it dropped in 2004 then went up recently. As is 
shown in the previous section, major system changes on software patents can be seen in 
1997, 2000 and 2002. The number of patent application increases in 1997 and 2000, but 
not in 2002. It is difficult to evaluate the impact of such system changes by looking at 
macro figures.   
(Figure 1) 9 
 
These kind of macro figures are driven by firms with a large number of patent 
applications. Therefore, we have evaluated the software patent system change by using 
a diffusion index (increase=1, no change=0, decrease=-1) for each year. The results are 
indicated in Figure 2. The diffusion index for the total number of claims is positive until 
1997, suggesting the number of firms with increasing claims surpasses the number of 
decreasing firms. This index becomes negative in 1998, which may be the result of a 
temporal patent application increase in 1997 due to the software patent system change 
in that year. On the other hand, the diffusion index moves up and down sharply after 
2000, and it is difficult to explain such movement by system change. A surge of patent 
application in 2000 and 2001 may be explained by other factors such as the IT bubble 
and business method patent boom.   
(Figure 2) 
Finally, we have looked at the year when software firms applied for patents for the first 
time. When pro-patent system change is introduced, it becomes easier for a software 
company to file a patent application. In this case, its incentive for R&D increases, which 
may result in a patent application increase. At the same time, there are some software 
companies, that had never previously patented, which started patenting their 
inventions. Therefore, we can expect larger numbers of firms to start patenting after the 
middle 1990’s. Figure 3 shows the number of firms by its first year of patent application.   
(Figure 3) 
The number of firms increases smoothly until the middle 1990’s. It is interesting to see 
that a substantial number of firms had already applied for patents before the middle 
1990’s. We could not find any jumps at the year of the patent system change. Here, it 10 
 
should be noted that there is a time lag between increases in innovation incentives and 
patent applications. In addition, a large number of firms started applying for patents in 
2000 and 2001, which may be explained again by the IT bubble and the business 
method patent boom. It is difficult to disentangle system change effect from these other 
factors.  
4.  Econometric analysis of patent and software innovation 
In this section, the relationship between patent and innovation for software firms is 
further investigated by econometric analysis. How shall we measure software 
innovation? The patent can be used as an innovation output measure in many cases, but 
we treat patents as an innovation input in this paper, because our focus is to evaluate 
the impact of software patent system reform. We have looked at the increasing trend of 
patent application at Japanese software firms in the previous section. The question is 
whether this trend leads to innovation output for these companies. 
Innovation output can be measured by the market value (Hall and McGarbie, 2006) or 
total factor productivity of firms (Minetaki and Motohashi, 2008). These indicators 
capture firm performance at the very end, so that it may be difficult to interpret and 
understand the results. Therefore, we use two indicators reflecting some mechanism of 
the relationship between patent and firm performance variables. One is the share of 
software sales to non software companies. The Japanese software industry can be 
characterized as a “multi-layered subcontracting system” (Minetaki and Motohashi, 
2008). A subcontracting structure is headed by a large system integrator and multiple 
subcontracting software companies support such a structure. In many cases, 
subcontracting firms are small and lack the technological capability of independent 11 
 
businesses. The share of software sales to non software companies reflects the degree of 
dependency of such a subcontracting structure.   
Another innovation output indicator is the share of prepackaged software sales. The 
dominance of such a subcontracting structure is related to the fact that large software 
users in Japan prefer custom made software instead of the prepackaged type 
(Motohashi,2006; Tanaka,2003). A system integrator modifies a software system 
adjusted to the individual needs of its customer, even in an application area where 
prepackaged software is available. This kind of supplier user practice requires a large 
system integrator which can deal with a large custom made software project. A small 
software vender cannot receive such a large order by itself, and subsequently deals with 
the subcontractor of large companies. However, there is a sign of growing small 
companies pursuing independent strategies by focusing on prepackaged software 
development. Therefore, the share of prepackaged software can reflect innovative 
activities at Japanese software firms.   
Table 4 shows these innovation indicators by first patent application year. It is difficult 
to read any pattern from this chart, but it seems that there is a negative relationship 
between prepackage share and first patent application year. There may be substantial 
time lag between patenting and innovation output (either for de-subcontract or for 
prepackage share), so that the negative correlation is conceivable in cross sectional look.   
(Figure 4) 
We have conduced regression analysis of these two innovation indicators as dependent 
variables with following explanatory variables. 
x  Log (Patent): Log of number of patents holding 12 
 
x  Log (Emp): Log of number of employees (firm size) 
x  RD_share: Share of R&D staff of total employees 
x  SE_share: Share of SE (system engineers) of total employees 
x  Programmer_share: Share of programmers of total employees 
x  Year dummies 
The regression results are provided in Table 2 (de-subcontracting share as a dependent 
variable) and Table 3 (prepackaged software sales share as a dependent variable). 
Models (1)-(3) are estimated by using the fixed effect model for panel data from 2001 to 
2005. Models (4)-(6) are based on the IV method by using logs of R&D expenditure as an 
instrument variable for logs of the number of patents. Models (2) and (5) are estimated 
by using samples of firms which applied for patents for the first time after 1996, and 
Model (3) and (6) are estimated by using samples from before 1995.   
(Table 2) and (Table 3) 
First, the positive relationship between patent and innovation for the de-subcontracting 
share is observed in the fixed effect model estimation results. This finding implies that 
a firm under the subcontracting structure can become independent by developing its 
own technology. It should be noted that a positive association is observed, particularly 
in samples after 1996. Therefore, it may be the case that pro-patent reform after the 
mid 1990’s contributes to software firms’ innovative activities. However, in the IV 
models, the coefficient to patent log samples after 1996 is positive, but not statistically 
significant. As for prepackage sale share, we could not find statistically significant 
coefficients to patent log counts. Instead, the firm size matters with this index.   13 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In Japan, the software patent system has been reformed and software is now a 
patentable subject matter. In this paper, this pro-patent shift on software was surveyed 
and its impact on software innovation was analyzed. Before the 1990’s, inventions 
related to software could not be patented by themselves, but they could be applied by 
being combined with hardware related inventions. Therefore, integrated electronics 
firms used to be major software patent applicants. However, during the period of the 
late 1990’s and early 2000’s, when software patent reforms were introduced, innovative 
activities (measuring patent applications) by independent software development firms 
began.  
We use the datasets linking IIP patent database (individual patent datasets by using 
JPO’s publication data) and firm level data from the Survey on Selected Services 
(software part) (METI) and Basic Survey of Business Activity and Structure (METI). 
Based on the panel datasets for roughly 550 firms from 2001 to 2005, we found that 
patent applications from software firms gradually increased from the 1990’s, but we 
could not find a direct impact of the software patent system reforms. In addition, it was 
also found that patent application is positively related to a software company’s 
independent strategy of the subcontracting system headed by large system integrators. 
The competitive standing of the software industry in Japan is notably low in terms of 
trade statistics, and its productivity is considered low in comparison to that of Europe 
and the United States (Imai and Ishino, 1993). This may be explained by the fact that 
labor intensive custom made software plays a dominant role in the Japanese software 
industry. In addition, the multi layered subcontracting system makes the situation 14 
 
worse, in the sense that small-scale subcontracting software firms lower the aggregated 
productivity level of the software industry. In this sense, pro-patent reform on software 
invention may induce independent strategies by in-house technological capabilities, and 
have a positive impact on the productivity in the Japanese software industry. 
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Table 1: Patent counts by IPC sub group 
  Ver. 2 Ver. 3 Ver. 4 Ver. 5 Ver. 6 Ver. 7 total
G06F17/60 0 0 461 0 137 1517 2115
G06F12/00 0 0 89 556 275 303 1223
G06F13/00 0 0 122 300 236 454 1112
G06F9/06 0 0 210 351 200 37 798
G06F17/30 0 0 111 0 158 495 764
G06F15/00 0 0 132 204 86 174 596
G06F15/20 0 3 175 321 0 0 499
G06F9/46 0 0 57 177 109 64 407
H04B7/26 0 0 227 88 20 24 359
G06F15/21 0 1 174 172 0 0 347
G06F15/60 0 0 119 222 0 0 341
G06F9/44 0 2 123 58 30 100 313
G06F11/28 0 1 26 136 78 70 311
G06F15/40 0 0 83 208 0 0 291
G06F3/06 0 0 32 123 51 69 275
H04L12/56 0 0 41 31 23 179 274
G06F15/16 0 1 23 146 76 22 268
G06F17/21 0 0 79 0 34 147 260
G06F19/00 0 0 26 0 113 109 248
H01L21/82 0 0 151 45 19 23 238
H04M3/42 0 1 22 77 73 62 235
G11C11/34 0 0 232 0 0 0 232
G06F3/14 0 0 12 111 74 31 228
G06F17/50 0 0 19 0 76 126 221
G06F15/62 0 0 97 119 0 0 216
H01L27/04 0 0 59 122 19 13 213
G06F1/00 0 0 88 62 30 28 208
G06F12/14 0 0 82 34 25 60 201
G06F11/34 0 0 22 81 36 56 195
H04L11/20 0 0 190 0 0 0 190
G06F11/22 0 1 22 106 40 19 188
H04M11/00 1 1 22 61 35 66 186
G06F3/12 0 0 35 78 29 37 179
G06F3/00 0 1 0 24 52 102 179
H04L13/00 0 1 174 0 0 0 175
G01R31/28 0 1 96 45 20 12 174
H04L12/28 0 0 23 21 49 73 166
G06Q50/00 00000 1 6 2 1 6 2
A63F9/22 0 0 10 9 140 0 159
A63F13/00 0 0 23 0 0 135 158
H04L11/00 0 0 157 0 0 0 157
G06K17/00 0 3 16 46 40 51 156
H03K19/00 0 1 118 11 2 4 136
G06F3/033 0 0 8 36 65 27 136
H04L9/00 0 0 126 7 1 0 134
G06F11/30 0 0 13 44 34 41 132
G06Q10/00 00000 1 2 7 1 2 7
G06F9/45 0 0 0 66 35 24 125
G06F15/30 0 1 66 51 0 0 118  17 
 





































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Regression results (Dependent variable=De-subcontract share) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE IV IV IV
all 1996- -1995 all 1996- -1995
Log(patent) 0.014 0.027 0.008 -5.244 1.020 -2.103
(1.87)+ (1.93)+ (0.98) (0.08) (0.45) (0.05)
Log(emp) 0.019 0.027 -0.005 1.010 0.060 1.401
(0.72) (0.85) (0.12) (0.08) (0.38) (0.05)
RD_share 0.496 0.543 0.351 6.144 1.082 3.781
(3.83)** (3.54)** (1.36) (0.08) (0.46) (0.06)
SE_share 0.022 0.008 0.037 0.055 -0.099 -0.199
(0.65) (0.18) (0.71) (0.05) (0.28) (0.03)
Programmer_share 0.014 0.085 -0.060 -0.262 -0.007 -0.391
(0.34) (1.52) (1.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.07)
Constant -0.366 -0.427 -0.217 -1.740 -0.881 -5.895
(2.48)* (2.37)* (0.82) (0.09) (0.69) (0.05)
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2586 1467 1119 1043 510 533
Number of kikatsu 691 396 295 351 185 166
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.01
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10% ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
Table 3: Regression results (Dependent variable=Prepackage share) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE IV IV IV
all 1996- -1995 all 1996- -1995
Log(patent) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.217 0.648 0.242
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.22) (0.44) (0.30)
Log(emp) 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.080 0.008 -0.076
(2.80)** (2.80)** (2.80)** (0.34) (0.06) (0.11)
RD_share 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.805 1.460 0.002
(0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.78) (0.91) 0.00
SE_share 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.015 0.009 0.013
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.04) (0.05)
Programmer_share 0.111 0.111 0.111 -0.007 0.057 0.054
(2.00)* (2.00)* (2.00)* (0.06) (0.28) (0.19)
Constant -0.568 -0.568 -0.568 -0.096 -0.125 0.365
(2.26)* (2.26)* (2.26)* (0.16) (0.12) (0.11)
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1047 1047 1047 998 489 509
Number of kikatsu 283 283 283 340 177 163
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10% ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 